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CULTURE, MEDIA & FILM | RESEARCH ARTICLE
“Challenging public rhetoric justifying immigrants
as ‘indecent’”
Aaron Martin1*, Lisette LeMerise1, Riya Chhabra1, Sudharshana P. Kanduri1 and Julia Beleshi1
Abstract: Elites employ various rhetorical strategies in public discourse, including
on the topic of immigration. As such, those with influence rely on storytelling to
shape views about the narratives related to immigrants as a minority out-group.
This has significant consequences, particularly in areas of policy development. Policy
shapers have isolated immigrant groups by creating certain ideologically derived
criteria well beyond citizenship for them to eventually receive “full American”
status. Further, such status first has required immigrants to unduly prove their
“worthiness” as exceptional—like being extra hardworking and very law abiding.
Our essay seeks to show how foundational rhetoric is often intentionally chosen in
order to categorize immigrants as inherently different and intrinsically inferior. As
an alternative, we propose a pragmatically conceived model of discourse for the
practice of public rhetoric that redescribes immigrant narratives as one of belonging
and inclusion. To this end, we draw on examples of how rhetoric, informed by
Richard Rorty, has sought to emphasize this-worldly commonalities rather than
metaphysical abstractions about similarity or difference. Pragmatism prevents the
philosophical justification of cruel acts endured by immigrants, both in indecent
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PUBLIC INTEREST STATEMENT
Language has the power to shape lives and
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rhetoric used by public figures has specifically
affected the experiences of immigrant popula-
tions. Historical and contemporary examples
abound with elected officials employing carefully
chosen terminology to marginalize vulnerable
constituencies. We trace certain instances of such
rhetorical strategies back to a philosophical
orientation to the world. We then attempt to
show how such philosophical presuppositions,
turned political ideology in the form of public
displays of divisive speech, can—and do—ratio-
nalize racial and religious prejudices and thereby
justify indecency toward, as well as legitimate the
mistreatment of, immigrants. In response, we
propose an alternative analytical framework
known as the pragmatic method. The vocabulary
of pragmatism, applied here to discourses on
loyalty and fraternity, reflects an emphasis on the
shared human susceptibility to feel pain and the
desire to avoid suffering, hopefully leading to
increased empathy and greater inclusivity.
Martin et al., Cogent Arts & Humanities (2020), 7: 1740538
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2020.1740538
© 2020 The Author(s). This open access article is distributed under a Creative Commons
Attribution (CC-BY) 4.0 license.
Received: 06 August 2019
Accepted: 26 February 2020
*Corresponding author: Aaron Martin,
Irvin D. Reid Honors College, Wayne
State University, 2516
Undergraduate Library, Detroit MI
48202, USA
E-mail: aaron.martin@wayne.edu
Reviewing editor:
Lincoln Geraghty, University of
Portsmouth, UK
Additional information is available at
the end of the article
Page 1 of 19
rhetoric and wrong-headed public policy, while simultaneously enlarging the defi-
nition of “one of us,” in part by reconceiving the notion of democratic loyalty.
Subjects: American Studies; Sociology & Social Policy; Rhetoric; Media Communication;
Intellectual History; Cultural Studies; Race & Ethnicity; Subcultures; Language & Linguistics
Keywords: Decency; democracy; foundationalism; immigrant; Richard Rorty; rhetoric;
pragmatism
1. Introduction
Rhetoric is used to justify indecency toward immigrants, as it characterizes them to be intrinsically
inferior to their citizen counterparts. This essay seeks a shift in public rhetoric—from one of
exclusion to one of inclusion, the result of which, we contend, would amount to a change in the
prevailing definition of the democratic American community to a more expansive one that would
include immigrants. Greater decency toward immigrants has origins in the use of rhetoric rooted in
the kind of acceptance that establishes loyalty among humans based on their shared susceptibility
to feel pain. With that, the first section establishes how public rhetoric can have meaningful
consequences, specifically as it pertains to telling stories and constructing narratives that shape
decisions meant to affect whether or not to treat immigrants with decency. We understand one
problematic strain of indecency to be the manifestation of certain deliberative rhetoric, and that if
elites with influence over large swaths of the general population were to shift from foundational
rhetoric to one of pragmatism, society could more easily replace the narrative of objectivity with
the preferred one of solidarity, and thereby promote greater inclusivity by emphasizing that shared
propensity to suffer and that mutual tendency to evade it. Relatedly, current as well as past public
uses of dehumanizing and apocalyptic rhetoric in the United States exemplify nostalgic narratives
to reinforce foundational ideology as a means for rationalizing the justification of indecent
behavior, particularly toward immigrant populations. In short, we seek to replace such metaphy-
sically based rationalizations with the pragmatic method—for pragmatism, in its outright denial of
all essentialist features, disallows for ideological rigidity to deem acceptable inhumane behavior
toward and indecent treatment of those individuals who are in greatest needed of structural
empathy (Rorty, 1993a, pp. 133–34).
In the next section, we attempt to demonstrate how past and present political leaders such as
Benjamin Franklin and Donald Trump have employed rhetoric grounded in foundationalism to
establish an in-group and an out-group dynamic among citizens and immigrants, respectively. The
characterization of immigrants as less than fully human typifies the indecency directed at them.
We unpack this process by scrutinizing and treating certain keywords carefully picked—ones like
“alien” and “rapists,” as a means to dehumanize immigrants on the one hand and to resonate with
and rile up would-be sympathizers on the other hand. We trace and give context to policies—
historical and contemporary—whose passage was aided by such rhetoric that shaped both the
political narrative of the issue as well as the life experiences of the immigrants themselves. For
example, the English-only movement has fanned inflammatory speech directed at those non-
English speaking individuals, without regard for the newness of their time in the U.S. It is critical,
we maintain, that those with a public voice are mindful of their rhetoric when describing immi-
grants because their words have—and still do—set in motion policies that include provisions with
discriminatory criteria that determine the narratives of what it means to belong in America.
Pragmatism presents an alternative to foundationalism—and, as a method, is more conducive
to enhance public rhetoric in a way that fosters a more harmonious atmosphere among the many
pluralistic communities in the U.S. Although pragmatism has received less attention than founda-
tionalism—at least comparatively so in philosophical and sociopolitical circles—its emphasis on
cultivating what is shared among existing communities, rather than theorizing about some general
nature of humanity, merits investigation. To that end, we analyze certain rhetoric—that is,
selected articulations specifically informed by a pragmatic orientation toward outcomes
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promoting decency in very particular instances—used by two vastly different U.S. presidents,
Thomas Jefferson and Barack Obama. Additionally, we offer historical examples that exemplify
the extension of greater protections and privileges to more constituencies and consider the
benefits of such outcomes. Overall, our focus here is on how pragmatic language nurtures an
enlarged (sense of) community. Finally, we argue why a pragmatic orientation toward the immi-
grant experience could increase the prospects of more decency and thus more human flourishing
for those living in America, the process of which, we maintain, is connected to the concept of
loyalty. For such new and greater alliances to form, we detail selected criteria used to define
certain groups and notice how differences are exacerbated with the use of foundational terminol-
ogy. More precisely, we see how an extreme and forceful rhetorical strategy relying on the
language of threat—often couched in dire prediction and steeped in the counterfactual—is voiced
in an ideological narrative consistent with foundational thought. One such example is the promise
of a utopian future, a doomed enterprise because of the foundational determinants that comprise
the terms themselves. Ultimately, however, we conclude that to move forward it would behoove
societies like the U.S to increasingly adopt pragmatism to help reduce the indecent treatment
experienced by immigrants—immigrants who, too, are loyal to democratic values.
2. Methods of rhetorical strategies
To begin, it is important to first specify the method we have selected to guide our analysis
throughout the essay as well as to clarify our use of a particular strain within the tradition of
pragmatism. Parsing out some of the more well-known intentions for deploying such a “vague,
ambiguous, and overworked word” (Rorty, 1982, p. 179) like pragmatism is vital to what we hope
to accomplish in what follows. In service of making the societal conditions more conducive for
enlarging the cultural capacity for treating others, particularly immigrants, with greater decency,
we theorize what we believe could be a plausible way forward, both in thought as well as in action,
for such a worthy scenario—more rhetorical civility and political inclusivity. With that, the argu-
mentative trajectory of this essay is developed using pragmatism, more as a methodological tool
for narrative than as a metaphysical or philosophical system for categorization. Theoretical inqui-
ries, such as this one, can aid in intellectual attempts at “mov[ing] toward contemporary con-
sensus” (Rorty, 1992, p. 2).
That is, pragmatism, more generally thought of, has been leveraged as an “action-guiding,” or
“practical activity,” for “problem-solving” (Rorty, 1993a, p. 119, 1993b, p. 443, 1993a, p. 119). Our
problematizing of rhetorical strategies, followed by subsequent policy proposals, takes these
overarching components of pragmatism, broadly conceived, from the likes of Charles Sanders
Peirce, William James, and John Dewey, respectively, into previously unchartered intellectual
terrain—that of Richard Rorty’s postmodernist pragmatism, often referred to as “neopragmatism,”
or more precisely, “Rortyan [neo]pragmatism.” Where Rorty’s pragmatic predecessors—and con-
temporaries alike—long abandoned what is known as the “correspondence theory of truth,” which
holds that some claim about what is true “corresponds to [the nature of] reality” (Rorty, 1980,
p. 721), as reality is the very project of doing metaphysics, Rorty provocatively goes much further,
maintaining that “there is no such things as truth at which we aim” (Auxier & Hahn, 2010, p. 30).
His outright denial of capital-t “truth” has made Rorty, as Richard J. Bernstein has noted for those
interested in and followers of pragmatism, the “villain” and “kidnapper of pragmatism” (Saatkamp,
1995, p. 62), in no small part due to the connection between Rorty’s influential status and his
audacious, postmodernism exemplified by his anti-philosophical announcement of capital-p phi-
losophy’s death.
Important here, for our purposes, is to acknowledge two things. First, that with Rorty, our goal is
to emphasize what is shared among those whose orientation to reading and interpretation are
informed by pragmatic themes, ones, for instance, like giving up on what Hilary Putnam calls “a
God’s-eye view” (Rorty, 1993b, p. 449) for objective truth-claims and abandoning “foundational-
ism,” or the assumption that some sort of “foundation” exists on which to build toward objective
truth (Rorty, 1979, p. 3). And second, that with supporters of Rorty as well as critics alike, both
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within pragmatism and outside of the tradition, we readily acknowledge that Rorty, or his writings
—some of the very ones used here to bolster our argumentative positions of “advocat[ing for]
pluralism” and giving credence to “a multitude of stories” (Hollinger and Depew, 1995, p. 38–9)—
does not possess authorial control over how Cornel West succinctly puts American pragmatism: “a
diverse and heterogeneous tradition” (West, 1989, p. 5). No one does, for pragmatism, like any
other intellectual lineage, is a “contested concept” (Saatkamp, 1995, p. 66). Similarly, rhetoric, as
we see it, at least in Rortyan terms, can never assume proprietorship over what is truly true or
“really real” (Benhabib & Fraser, 2004, p. 9); this is what we intend to show—that is, from
a particularly Rortyan perspective, as method within the tradition, which we will refer to as
“pragmatism” rather than, say, “Rortyan [neo]pragmatism,” or some variation of that sort because
of the preceding bracketing, the intention of which has been to appropriately delineate our use of
the term pragmatism from others’ use as well as to prevent, to the degree possible, the charge of
conflating differences, be it in emphasis at the margins or on the most substantive matters
debated among pragmatists (Auxier & Hahn, 2010, p. 75).
Rhetoric has power. In this sense, words with their various meanings are combined in
a multitude of patterns to communicate a desired message. Depending on the speaker or writer’s
intent and effectiveness of her choices, these language patterns can elicit responses within readers
or listeners, whether they be a meager laugh, a proposal to think, or a massive call to action.
According to the linguistic Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis, the language one uses and hears can influence
one’s thoughts and perceptions, leading to various effects on that person (Hussein, 2012). Thus, we
suggest that the language people choose has consequences. This applies to the public sphere
where these consequences can have major political outcomes that are potentially as widespread
as influencing societal thoughts and paradigms. Voting patterns and enacted policies best illus-
trate this. It has been suggested that anyone involved in public discourse is a political actor
involved in intentionality (Reyes, 2011, p. 783), where “no word is gratuitous, no phrase is
formulated just for the sake of it, everything is actually the result of deliberate behaviour” (Cuza
& Mocanu, 2016). Consequently, the act of deliberately choosing specific rhetoric is often employed
by those in the public sphere to gain legitimacy and public support to justify social acts (Utych,
2017, p. 441), as these supposed actors strategically choose words advantageously (Reyes, 2011,
pp. 782–784). Such strategies create legitimization, particularly allowing “political leaders [to]
justify their political agenda to maintain or alter the direction of a whole nation and, in the case
of US leaders, the entire world” (Reyes, 2011, p. 783).
Therefore, it is possible for these strategies to induce social acts like the justification of indecent
behavior toward fellow human beings. According to Critical Discourse Analysis, such strategies
include evoking emotions, generating a hypothetical future, rationalizing, citing experts, and
portraying oneself or one’s goals as altruistic or beneficial (Reyes, 2011, pp. 784–787). The use of
incivility itself in political discourse is considered a tactic, suggesting that “politics [have] become
organized around indignation, to the point that it is sometimes hard to imagine politics without the
indignation that frames it” (Benson, 2011, p. 28). Thus, individuals have become accustomed to
uncivil discourse, so much so that it is hardly questioned when used. For instance, politicians utilize
dehumanizing rhetoric in an effort to separate people into in-groups and out-groups. They claim
something is fundamentally nonhuman about the out-group, pinning the groups against each
other and allowing politicians to more easily rally the in-group in support of policies against the
out-group (Devine, 2015, p. 510): “Insofar as incivility is a mode of speech, it nowadays represents
itself, implicitly, as an index of identity—of race, class, gender, power, identity, authenticity, region,
history, and ideology. For some, ‘she’s one of us’; for the rest, ‘she’s one of them’” (Benson, 2011,
p. 26). Generally, rhetoric chosen by one with influence in the public sphere can have indecent
consequences, as it promotes separation among immigrants and groups. However, this would
indicate that the converse is also true; by using an alternative rhetoric that promotes community,
more decent outcomes could arise. Hence, Rorty has proposed two forms of rhetoric with alter-
native outcomes: foundationalism and pragmatism (Rorty, 1989a, pp. 168–69).
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Foundationalism serves as an approach toward rhetoric that utilizes an objective vocabulary to
justify decent or indecent behavior. According to Rorty, “[w]e are the heirs of this objectivist
tradition, which centers round the assumption that we must step outside our community long
enough to examine it in the light of something which transcends it” (Rorty, 1989a, p. 168).
Respectively, foundationalism is an ideology with the premise that the world and each part of it
have one true nature to be discovered. It assumes that this nature inherently exists, and the
ultimate truth is inevitable. Thus, they serve as the objective standards by which to make compar-
isons and draw conclusions, particularly about the choices and actions of others. However, how
one decides on an ultimate truth depends on their foundation, as the ideology’s name implies, and
his or her means of finding the truth: “[He] must construct an epistemology which has room for
a kind of justification which is not merely social but natural, springing from human nature itself”
(Rorty, 1989a, p. 169). A foundation may be any concept on which to base judgement, such as
religion, but the fact that foundationalists are in search of something inherent provides them with
the capability to potentially justify any act in service of discovering truth, even if said act would be
considered indecent. Due to its emphasis on objectivity and focus on the comparison against one
objective truth that seems to transcend humanity, the foundational vocabulary is considered “non-
human” (Rorty, 1989a, p. 171). Missing the human aspect, foundationalism can more easily stress
differences between diverse groups of people, indicating a vocabulary that could more easily
justify indecency.
In contrast, pragmatism maintains its human aspects within its vocabulary, as it rejects the
notion of using an ideology to find that which transcends humanity and the finding of what is
nonhuman. In fact, it abandons the possibility of “finding” altogether, since pragmatism “giv[es]
up the attempt at a God’s-eye [view] of things, the attempt at contact with the non-human which
[Rorty] has been calling ‘the desire for objectivity’” (Rorty, 1989a, p. 171). Although this may be
disconcerting to some since they draw comfort from hoping that one true answer is achievable,
pragmatism offers another form of hope: rhetorical redescription for the possibility of the better-
ment of humanity and the prevention of cruelty. The pragmatist employs a rhetoric that recognizes
the necessity of comparison between people and between cultures, real or imaginary, so as to use
the past and what one imagines could be “to make the best selves for ourselves that we can”
(Rorty, 1989b, p. 80). In turn, this promotes a common social hope which unites diverse groups and
promotes solidarity on the basis of feeling rather than objectivity, suggesting pragmatic rhetoric to
more easily promote decency. Pragmatists want “our chances of being kind, of avoiding humilia-
tion of others, to be expanded … [They think] that recognition of a common susceptibility to
humiliation is the only social bond that is needed” (Rorty, 1989b, p. 91). Therefore, pragmatic
rhetoric does not allow for justifications of actions to go beyond the pain of others in the service of
something larger than humanity itself. Rather, because pragmatists realize their own susceptibility
to suffer, their rhetoric cannot be used to justify the suffering of another. Thus, the justification of
indecency is much more difficult, and the ability to prevent cruelty becomes an easier task.
One can see the contrast exemplified when foundationalism is taken to its most extreme in the
public sphere through apocalyptic rhetoric. Apocalyptic rhetoric proclaims an inevitable cata-
strophe on the basis of some foundation. Oftentimes, the foundation is religious, and promotes
a strong fear toward immigrants through the creation of crisis: “Its voice mixes horror and hope,
nightmare and dream, destruction and creation, dystopia and utopia. Tuned into that which is
inevitable if not predetermined, it is also the voice of prophecy, the voice that knows how our story,
our history, ends, and how it begins anew” (Stewart & Harding, 1999, p. 286). This portrays an
ultimate truth through hyperbole (Ivie, 2017, p. 707), and because there must be some cause,
public speakers employ objectivity by “ … scapegoating that rejects as alien those who either do
not know or refuse to learn the secret plan or message … Traditional apocalyptic is fundamentally
an operation that excludes something or someone” (Gunn, 2008, p. 95). In turn, scared or angry
policy makers often support more indecent acts against the scapegoat whether the chosen
foundation is true or not. They consider these scapegoats to be unlike them, as these scapegoats
could not possibly comprehend the prophecy. Pragmatism, by contrast, cannot assume an
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apocalyptic problem in the first place, for it rejects the notion of inevitability and the creation of
a scapegoat or out-group entirely. Pragmatists “[make] a change rather than [discover] a fact”
(Rorty, 1989b, p. 77), so the discovery of an apocalypse, and one that promotes objectivity rather
than solidarity, would not be fitting.
Consequently, one can see how the rhetoric chosen by a person in the public sphere can
dramatically alter the story being told. This concept is further substantiated by prominent rhetor-
icians, including the narrative theorist Kenneth Burke who suggested that a function of rhetoric is
the “use of words by human agents to form attitudes or to induce actions in other human agents”
(Brock et al., 1990, p. 184). That is, stories about an immigrant or out-group, if told enough times,
can eventually become an overarching narrative that influences the public’s opinion of said
immigrant or out-group. The key, then, becomes the type of rhetoric used because the chosen
rhetoric could manipulate the public’s views and eventual actions. This is especially true of
immigrants, and one can easily see instances occurring to those in the U.S. For example, politicians
often promote objectivity with foundational rhetoric by creating immigrants as out-groups and the
stereotypical white American as the in-group. To do so, animalistic or dangerous rhetoric is often
used: “using analogies to disasters, vermin, or disease, political elites are able to deny dehuma-
nized immigrants or out-groups some level of humanity, which makes it easier for the American
public to support harsh and punitive action against them” (Utych, 2017, p. 440). In the eyes of the
American in-group, immigrants described as such are inherently different, as if they were animals,
incapable of the “ability to reason, think critically, or feel emotions” (Utych, 2017, p. 440). As
a result, immigrants should be treated without empathy, justifying indecent policies toward them,
including the prevention of their immigration entirely. Another such example toward immigrants is
the nostalgia narrative, commonly associated with displacement and resistance to social and
cultural change. Residents battling gentrification often tell nostalgic tales about better times
before newcomers arrived “to stake their claim for the future,” while highlighting how their
community was ruined as jobs and land were taken and how their quality of life supposedly
decreased (Maly et al., 2012, p. 760). This paints immigrants as destroyers of what was once
safe and dear, suggesting they should not be treated with empathy; they are not one of “us”—not
a genuine part of society.
Consequently, narratives help people quickly navigate how to treat groups of various people, like
immigrants or out-groups, whether that be with decency or indecency. They tap into the currently
held cultural views of that group, making decency seemingly contextual (Benson, 2011, p. 26).
Hence, one could potentially promote greater decency toward immigrants using pragmatic rheto-
ric instead of foundational rhetoric by reforming the way in which the common narrative is told.
Narrative simply creates a framework that can be easily used and understood in public discourse:
“The value of narrative … is that it is flexible, and responsive to different ways of understanding
and interpreting experience” (McArdle, 2012, p. 181). Instead of comparing immigrants against
some ultimately true way they should be and treating them indecently if they do not fit that mold,
public discourse could focus on the commonality between immigrants and current citizens: the
common susceptibility to suffer (Rorty, 1989b, p. 91). In turn, this pragmatic narrative could
promote empathy between the two groups to prevent cruelty, but “[f]or empathy—when its
relevance is recognized—to be effective, it must tap into the cultural narratives and expectations
that are meaningful for others” (McArdle, 2012, p. 180). What is currently meaningful may not
necessarily be the empathetic narrative, particularly since the current understanding of policy
narrative follows a pattern requiring a hero, a villain, a victim, and sadly, a judge (Shanahan et al.,
2013, p. 457).
Many politicians use policy narratives as a tool to form characters, which is advantageous since
it is considered a highly reliable strategy, especially when discussing the “distribution of costs and
benefits among the characters of the policy narrative” (Shanahan et al., 2013, p. 460). Narrative
building allows for the characterization of real people, and depending on the connotations of the
given characterization, each individual is likely to be treated differently. Hence, heroes tend to be
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treated with respect and civility due to the presentation of their low costs and high benefits, while
villains are treated with disgust and indecency due to the presentation of their high costs and low
benefits (Shanahan et al., 2013, p. 460). Not only does this allow for the easier creation of in-
groups as heroes and out-groups as villains, but also using rhetoric that implies characterization
suggests that real people must fit those characterizations, or, as Rorty suggests, those foundations
and the criteria for them (Rorty, 1989b, p. 75). Characterizations can promote objectivity, separa-
tion, and, in turn, the justification of indecency. Tactics like these are often applied to immigration
policies, with immigrants being portrayed as villains or “[t]he entity responsible for the damage
done to the victim” (Shanahan et al., 2013, p. 459). Because villains are commonly associated with
evil and the cause of problems, people often treat immigrants as the source of a nation’s problems
in politics, particularly when said by an influential figure like the U.S. President. Yet, it is important
to note that the language utilized by a political figure often reflects the tone and context of
a nation, leading to the possibility for greater pragmatic rhetoric and potentially greater decency
toward immigrants as well, depending on the nation’s contextual situation. “[P]residents tailor
their policy statements on salient issues to match the majority public opinion polls” (Arthur &
Woods, 2013, p. 470), indicating that other political figures do so as well, as evident through the
analysis of prominent political figures and their rhetoric across various historical contexts.
3. Indecent treatment of immigrants
Politicians shape their candidacies and political narratives on the basis of appealing to certain
constituencies (Waldinger, 2018, pp. 1411–1426). Then-candidate Donald Trump made his anti-
immigration stance clear at the forefront of his presidential bid by announcing that Mexico was not
an ally of the U.S. because “when Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re
not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that have lots of problems, and
they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re
rapists” (“Here’s Donald Trump’s”, 2015). Trump’s rhetoric is rooted in foundationalism, as his
words imply that being Mexican inherently makes those immigrants more prone to being rapists,
drug users, and criminals. His repetition of “they are not sending you” creates an us-versus-them
dynamic that dehumanizes Mexicans. In Trump’s eyes, the term “human being” is synonymous
with “member of our tribe,” but the immigrants are not seen as “paradigm members of the
species.” Instead, these people are first seen as a—if not the—“problem” (Rorty, 1993a, p. 114).
Overall, the portrayal of immigrants as unequal justifies indecent behavior toward them. If they
are not considered equal, then by extension, they do not deserve the same “inalienable human
rights” as Americans. In order to be worthy of decency, these immigrants have to prove them-
selves by first freeing themselves of stereotypical caricatures and even accomplishing more than
earning a living wage from some entry level job. Under such premises, immigrants are expected to
achieve a higher standard of success that improves and advances society in some fashion—and
only then are worthy candidates for decent treatment.
Trump’s foundational rhetoric also shapes the lives of Muslim immigrants, indicating that this is
a continuing rhetorical trend in his narrative toward immigrants. On his campaign site, Trump
initially stated,
Without looking at the various polling data, it is obvious to anybody the hatred is beyond
comprehension. Where this hatred comes from and why we will have to determine. Until we
are able to determine and understand this problem and the dangerous threat it poses, our
country cannot be the victims of horrendous attacks by people that believe only in Jihad and
have no sense of reason or respect for human life. (Johnson, 2015)
Even though Trump is not directly targeting Muslim immigrants, the generalizations made in his
statements attach a stigma to all Muslims. By claiming that Muslims lack reason or respect, Trump
is asking his audience to think in terms of rational versus irrational. As a result, people are divided
into two groups: the good versus the bad. The identity of his audience is “bound up with their sense
of who they are not.” Compared to the Muslims, Trump’s audience “[thinks] of themselves as being
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a certain good sort of human being—a sort defined by explicit opposition to a particularly bad
sort,” or, in other words, the ones who have reason and thus respect for human life (Rorty, 1993a,
p. 126). In this case, “bad” becomes synonymous with Muslim immigrants. Then, similar to Mexican
immigrants, they do not receive access to decency as the “good” or American people do.
Trump’s views on immigration that “[T]he U.S. has become a dumping ground for everybody
else’s problems” (“Here’s Donald Trump’s”, 2015) can seem shocking. However, his views follow an
ongoing trend of anti-immigrant sentiment that has existed since the U.S. was an English Colony.
While Trump has proudly embraced his German heritage by publicly announcing that “[w]e passed
Trump Tower, 69 stories. I looked up and I said, ‘This is a long way from Kallstadt,’” in reference to
his grandfather’s German hometown (Hansler, 2017). German immigrants were not always wel-
come in the U.S. Yet part of Trump’s self-proclaimed legacy is that he is a descendant of
immigrants himself. Trump’s behavior toward Mexican and Muslim immigrants parallels how
Benjamin Franklin, a founding fathers and former governor of Pennsylvania, would have treated
Trump, the immigrant. In 1751, Benjamin Franklin expressed resentment toward German immi-
grants by questioning, “Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a Colony of
Aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them, and will
never adopt our Language or Customs any more than they can acquire our Complexion?” (Mott,
1936). Franklin uses foundationalism to argue that Germans are inferior. Even though a goal of
foundationalism is to provide everyone with “inalienable human rights,” by changing the definition
of human, or in this case, an American colonist, Franklin does not extend those same rights to
German immigrants (Rorty, 1993a, p. 112). The Germans’ maintenance of their culture and
language deviates from what Franklin considers American. He implies that, just like the German
immigrants cannot change their skin color to become whiter, they cannot change their behavior to
become more American. In his eyes, Germans were inherently less American and, as a result,
ought not to receive the freedoms and privileges that the English settlers in Pennsylvania were
inclined to enjoy.
Precise word choices have morphed over time, but the intended effect remains: the creation of
an in-group versus an out-group. Immigrants are usually sequestered to the out-group, while
those considered American reside in the in-group. The group dynamic that is created “contrast[s] …
the real humans, with rudimentary, or perverted, or deformed examples of humanity” by “manip-
ulating [the in-group’s] sentiments in such a way that they imagine themselves in the shoes of the
despised and oppressed. The only people they have trouble being nice to are the ones they
consider ‘irrational’” (Rorty, 1993a, p. 126). However, the message remains the same: the immi-
grants, although countries of origin fluctuate, are the ones placed into the out-group—and the
greater perceived differences, in face and custom alike, the more solitary the confinement to the
out-group designation is. The further an immigrant purportedly deviates from the traditional
American standard so do the (timely) chances of transitioning into the in-group. For instance, at
first Germans were not so-called white enough to be American. However, in comparison to other
immigrant populations, such as contemporary Mexicans and Muslims, German features resembled
American “whiteness” more so with their light complexion and European ancestry. These simila-
rities shifted the out-group, as it expanded to include those who were once excluded. Once joining
the in-group, it is these same immigrants who perpetuate out-group status. The indecency that
they once faced is now passed on to the current out-group. To maintain their in-group status, the
perpetrators justify their actions by the notion that because it was done to them, it should be done
to other immigrants.
With the benefit of hindsight, one could assume Franklin’s audience with whom his discrimina-
tion resonated was responding irrationally. The same goes for Trump’s most ardent supporters.
Labeling them as irrational, however—at least for Rorty—is not to take a thorough accounting of
the process for which they find themselves in agreement with Trump’s accusations. Moreover, such
conclusions that these supporters’—and Trump’s, too—failure to recognize their contingent loca-
tion in American history, something the rest of us do, amounts to the unhelpful, self-
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congratulatory assessment that, we, the “good people know something these bad people do not
know, and that it is probably their own silly fault that they do not know it” (Rorty, 1993a, p. 127).
Instead, it is important to view these differences through a lens of security and sympathy.
According to Maslow’s hierarchy of human needs, security is a Deficient need while sympathy is
a Being need. In order for a person’s attention to shift from self-interest to selflessness, she needs
to move up the hierarchy from Deficient needs to Being needs (D’Souza & Gurin, 2016). Politicians’
negative portrayal of immigrants leave their audience feeling insecure in the presence of immi-
grants. Without a sense of security, audience members are not able to picture themselves in
“conditions of life [that are] sufficiently risk-free … to make one’s difference from others inessential
to one’s self-respect, one’s sense of worth” (Rorty, 1993a, p. 128). By using labels like “aliens” or
“rapists,” immigrants automatically become part of any ongoing problem in the nation. As minority
groups, immigrants lack the powerful voice and influence achieved by the majority, which allows
politicians to scapegoat immigrants and shift responsibility from citizens onto those whom they
consider outsiders now. Once immigrants are seen as outsiders, audience members find it very
difficult to be sympathetic toward them. In our sense, “sympathy is the sort of reaction that …
white Americans had more of after reading Uncle Tom’s Cabin” (Rorty, 1993a, p. 128). As a result,
“security and sympathy go together, for the same reasons that peace and economic productivity
go together.” For the audience, “the tougher things are, the more you have to be afraid of … the
less you can afford the time or effort to think about what things might be like for people with
whom you do not immediately identify” (Rorty, 1993a, p. 128). If audience members cannot
achieve security in this situation, they are less likely to feel sympathy toward immigrants.
The overall immigrant experience is largely shaped by the rhetoric that is used to describe them.
By allowing politicians to set the narrative for immigrants, even before they have a chance to tell
their own story, places the power in the hands of a select few. The “idea that people on top hold
the future in their hands,” if foundationally informed, paves the way for them to use rhetoric to
justify indecent treatment (Rorty, 1993a, p. 130). Foundationalism has been used to set the criteria
for who qualifies as “American” or, here, who is worthy of decency. With Franklin, the criteria were
based on complexion and language similarities, but with Trump, however, it is rooted in the
presence of what he considers basic human traits like reason or respect. This set of criteria has
evolved from attacking immigrants’ physical differences to attacking their morals, straining even
further any capacity to access in-group benefits.
As such, it falls upon politicians to pay mind to the known harm their speech befalls onto
vulnerable immigrant communities, especially when their discriminatory promises are expected
to become institutionalized through the enactment of campaign platforms. In short, seemingly
fleeting words turn into binding laws. Take for instance, the English-only movement. Its aim is to
erase other languages spoken in a single country. Such an initiative has been modified over the
decades, but its premise holds: Franklin’s efforts to Anglify German immigrants manifested itself in
his trusteeship of the “Charity Schools,” whose curriculum reflected the goals of the movement.
Franklin justified his actions by claiming that this would qualify German children “for all the
advantages of English subjects” (Frantz, 1998). Franklin’s statements implied that, if Germans
did not speak English, they were not considered equal to the other English settlers and therefore
were not entitled to their rights. In Trump’s case, he supports the Raise Act, which replaces the
current selection scheme for immigrants with a point system that prioritizes “high English test
scores” (Gelatt, 2017). This not only restricts the flow of immigrants, but it also restricts the quality
of life for immigrants already here. Instead of creating greater unity, the focus on only one
language creates division, as it directly targets immigrants and makes them feel inferior if they
lack the ability to speak English. The immigrants’ conservation of their own language is used as
just another reason to exclude them.
One way to improve the typical immigrant experience is shifting from a rhetoric dominated by
foundational ideology to one associated with pedagogical sentimentalism, or in Rorty’s terms,
adopting a “sentimental education” because doing so would allow “us [to] concentrate our
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energies on manipulating sentiments” (Rorty, 1993a, p. 122), rather than getting continuously
bogged down in talk about who is rational or not for believing this political narrative or that
campaign message, or whatever the case might be. Sentimental education begins when people
of different backgrounds are sufficiently acquainted with one another to the effect that hearers
become increasingly “less tempted to think of those different from [themselves] as only quasi-
human” (Rorty, 1993a, p. 123). Subsequently, citizens can come together to extend immigrants the
same decency that has since been afforded them. An increase in decency will help foster a sense
of community and solidarity that has “no foundation except shared hope and the trust created by
such sharing” (Rorty, 1989b, p. 179). Sentimental education focuses on the similarities between
and among groups of people rather than on their differences. It is the “desire to extend the
reference of ‘us’ as far as we can” (Rorty, 1989b, p. 169). Adopting sentimentality would help to
shed labels such as “irrational,” “bad,” and “less American.” The creation of a spectrum where
overlapping physical and behavioral traits blur one into another would replace distinct criteria for
hierarchal categories of humanness that separate and then justify exclusion and ultimately
legitimate persecution. Expanding definitions of concepts like “our kind of people” and “people
like us” would create the conditions for an enlarged community not based on complexion,
language, or culture but rather on the shared ability to feel pain, physical or otherwise (Rorty,
1993a, p. 123).
4. Extended decency
The concept of sentimental education is a tool pragmatism employs for emphasizing similarities
over differences. Although the pragmatic method’s history in the U.S. is a rich one, foundational-
ism, as an ideology, has dominated the rhetorical narrative of political discourse. With that,
though, pragmatic themes appear in correspondences and speeches alike. For example, Thomas
Jefferson, founding father and 3rd president of the U.S., used intermittent foundational words to
convey what were at times important pragmatic messages. In his Notes on the State of Virginia,
Jefferson writes that “it does [him] no injury for [his] neighbor to say that there are twenty Gods or
no God” (Rorty, 1988, p. 257). For our purposes, Rorty’s use of Jefferson here shows how founda-
tional appeals to the purported objective by invoking the name of God as synonymous with the
first of all premises from which to assign morality and then to assess progress. In this specific
context, however, Jefferson’s utilization of God is not necessarily impeding progress, as it were,
but demonstrates the pervasive nature of forming would-be effective arguments characterized by
foundational assumptions. Interestingly, though, Jefferson’s statements contain pragmatic think-
ing when attempting to make religion irrelevant for developing and maintaining a more stable
democratic society whose inhabitants must build community and cooperate to ensure mutual
protection. In fact, Jefferson warns that focusing too much on religious affiliation breeds fanati-
cism—a particularly dangerous threat to democracies. Here, the term “religion” emphasizes the
many differences, from skin color to language to cultural practice, that arise in society used to
discriminate, particularly against minority and marginalized groups like immigrants.
A pragmatized Jefferson discourages such discriminatory practices on the basis of cultivating
the conditions for rampant indecency toward those relegated to out-group status: immigrants
themselves.
Such examples involving treatment of immigrants demonstrate a historical reliance on pragma-
tism as outcome-driven in public rhetoric. For as Rorty has intimated, pragmatism promotes the
idea of sensitivity toward others from diverse backgrounds. It seeks to build human relationships
by implanting the idea that human suffering is painful, and one way to remove that suffering is by
recreating “human selves [through the enlargement] of a variety of relationships which constitute
those selves” (Rorty, 1999, p. 79). For instance, immigrants entering the U.S. hope for a positive
turn in their lives, as it offers supposed opportunities unavailable in their countries of origin. Typical
for immigrants to bring beliefs different from some more widely held in the U.S., Jefferson
discounts its relevancy or importance, yet suggests government play a role in ensuring protections
exist from predatory majoritarianism. The establishment of such societal conditions, undergirded
by the force of law, pushes culture toward greater acceptance and tolerance. As Rorty suggests,
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this relational shift engenders an increasingly unified community to shove aside private matters,
like religious belief or lack thereof, while simultaneously nurturing inclusivity and decency to
groups, like immigrants, previously denied the courtesy of the benefit of the doubt.
Despite the existence of pragmatic strands in important democratic theory as well as in policy
formulation, the narrative arc of the immigrant storyline in the U.S. is decidedly foundational. For
instance, after the California Gold Rush in the mid-1800 s, thousands of Chinese immigrants
entered San Francisco. The Chinese worked low-wage, labor-intensive jobs enduring the longest
workdays to support their families—much to the chagrin of resentful citizens. Americans
bemoaned the Chinese for stealing jobs from Americans. Popular newspapers like The Chronicle
detailed storylines of whites who
called the Chinese workers ‘heathens’ and ‘cruel murderers’ … while [China Towns] were cast
as places where Chinese men went to gamble, smoke opium, and engage in prostitution …
[which put] more pressure from the West … [and] on Congress to do something about the
increasing rates of immigration. (Dunigan, 2017)
Words like “heathens” and “cruel murders” portrayed Chinese immigrants as destructive agents of
a society vulnerable to succumb to their habits and tastes. Furthermore, it gave citizens even more
reason to echo that “they are not one of us.” This dehumanizing rhetoric eventually informed the
shaping of “The Chinese Exclusion Act” that banned Chinese immigration from 1882 to 1943. One
way the indecent treatment of Chinese immigrants could have been avoided is if American citizens
had approached the context and issue alternatively. A more pragmatic orientation toward ame-
liorating tension, borne from resentment, if such were the case, is the “philosophical search
[focused] instead on [the human] ability to make the particular things that divide [them] seem
unimportant” (Rorty, 1999, p. 86). For instance, in the event that greater attention was paid to the
real benefits of these immigrants’ work, whose labor produced economic development enjoyed by
the established citizens, the narrative shift reflecting immigrant contribution to advancement
would also produce great capacity for progress, as also defined by fraternity and solidarity.
It is possible to see the trajectory of the immigrant experience, in certain ways, having improved
over time. In context, Rorty’s advocacy for replacing “traditional metaphors of depth and height
with metaphors of breadth and extent” can apply specifically to real-world examples involving
immigrant-centered discourse (Rorty, 1999, p. 87). It places greater emphasis on what immigrants
add to society as well as on what similarities immigrants share with American citizens. Former
President Barack Obama showcased something similar during his prime time speech on immigra-
tion in 2014. Obama’s rhetoric is examined here using a pragmatic, or anti-essentialist, reading,
where he attempts to break down the intrinsic and extrinsic features of people (Rorty, 1999, p. 72).
During the speech, Obama mentioned that he would work to “make it easier and faster for high-
skilled immigrants, graduates and entrepreneurs to stay and contribute to our economy, as so
many business leaders proposed” (Lawler & Schaffer, 2016, p. 102). Later, he reminded Americans
that “[they were] here only because this country welcomed [immigrants] in and taught them that
to be an American is about something more than what we look like, or what our last names are …
and what makes us Americans is our shared commitment to an ideal—that all of us are created
equal” (Lawler & Schaffer, 2016, p. 105). By drawing on the past, Obama nudged Americans to
remember how they—or their family members—got to the place, literally and figuratively, they
currently occupied. He implied that they, too, were once defined as extrinsically the out-group.
Therefore, by excluding current immigrants, citizens were exhibiting the intolerance decried by
their family’s immigrant story and perpetuating the divisions impeding progress.
Furthermore, Obama’s suggestion of looking past the physical traits of immigrants and rather at
their skillset supports a pragmatic reading, as it is an attempt to blur the external divisions that
characterize different groups of people. As a result, it encourages the decent treatment of
immigrants, as they, too, are considered worthy of equal consideration and, in turn, given
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opportunity previously denied to them. Moreover, the term “shared” represents the relational
aspect of pragmatism. It focuses on the human connection common to all. However, although
Obama’s outcome-driven rhetoric exhibits strands of pragmatism, his appeal to the U.S.
Constitution rings of foundationalism: to recite that “all men are created equal” purports the
existence of some equalizing intrinsic quality that is somehow essential to being human.
Pragmatism, on the other hand, maintains that these documents are “influenced by Christian
doctrines of the brotherhood of man” rather than the recognition of a philosophically derived
human essence (Rorty, 1999, p. 85). Obama further injected foundational criteria by referencing
doctrines that incorporate ideas of exclusion based on some notion of worthiness for equality. This
side of Obama’s rhetoric shows that, despite the occasional pragmatic phrasing, foundationalism
is pervasive in formulating narratives about how to cope with one another.
Another option for moving beyond foundational rhetoric is individual redescription, “compar[ing]
the results with alternative redescriptions which use the vocabularies of alternative figures” (Rorty,
1989b, p. 80). Redescription allows people to reinterpret scenarios in which steps can be taken to
create increasingly better versions of themselves. The act of continuously describing and rede-
scribing immigrants reveals errors within the stories people tell about them. Take for instance, that
on 14 August 1776, Jefferson writes,
[I]t [has] been the wise policy of these states to extend the protection of their laws to all
those who should settle among them … to a participation of the benefits of civil and religious
freedom, and … the benevolence of this practice as well as its salutary effects [has] rendered
it worthy of being continued in future times. (Army and Navy Pension, 1852)
Here, Jefferson hopes to earn the trust of immigrants by stating that America provides liberties
previously deprived under British rule. By doing so, Jefferson persuades immigrants to enter
America, which eventually aided in strengthening the country’s military. His intention is evident
in words like “salutary effects” and “worthy.” These words also help extend decency toward
immigrants since, in this particular way, the citizens were to interpret immigrants as arriving to
help fight against monarchal tyranny. Moreover, Jefferson’s words mean to establish trust
between citizens and immigrants by portraying each party as reliable partners.
It is possible to suggest that Jefferson’s take can be “adopted to recreate ourselves, in whole or
in part” (Rorty, 1989b, pp. 79–80). Similarly, Obama adopts imagery of Americans treating immi-
grants with decency in his Executive Actions speech by highlighting that “our tradition of welcom-
ing immigrants from around the world … has kept us youthful, dynamic, and entrepreneurial. It has
shaped our character as people with limitless possibilities. We [are] not trapped by our past, but
[are] able to remake ourselves as we choose” (Lawler & Schaffer, 2016, p. 101). Like Jefferson,
Obama assures that immigrants will receive support. However, Obama emphasizes the arrival of
immigrants who possess expertise. Though the limitation that Obama asserts is objective, its
thrust is sympathetic to a pragmatized interpretation, as it contains a mechanism for hope of
improving the economic and infrastructural conditions of the country, the result of which furthers
progress. By listing the benefits that come with newly-arriving immigrants, Obama reassures
citizens in constructing a positive image that immigrants have of America and Americans. In
other words, he urges Americans and immigrants alike to work on being the best possible versions
of themselves—as members of a single community.
Pragmatism, as a method for orienting individuals, readily endorses the creation of a larger, more
inclusive community, where respect, dignity, and prosperity are championed and celebrated.
Throughout history, immigrants have had to sacrifice their own identities to meet some fabricated
standard of what counts as full citizen. Americanizing was one such plausible option for allowing
immigrants to access some semblance of parity in opportunity. To illustrate this, a German-born
piano maker who came to the U.S. during the 19th century changed his name from Charles Steinweg
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to Charles Steinway because English musicians were paid more and assumed to be more skilled
(Roberts, 2010). Similarly, the white superiority ideology was also expressed in the anti-blackness
movement where personal, physical, social, and structural attacks on African Americans were taken
to extreme measures (Blum, 2018). These events not only represent brutal acts of racism and
discrimination, but they also promoted the degradation of minority groups more generally. These
ideas are in stark contrast to the pragmatists’ non-psychopathic identity. Non-psychopaths are
people “who find concern for others” and believe that everyone is related to one another because
of the overlap between their needs and struggles (Rorty, 1999, p. 78). American culture has largely
been devoid of the non-psychopathic citizen character during the numerous anti-immigrant waves.
One method to prevent continued out-group formation and designation is to champion non-
psychopathic behavioral norms through pushing the extension of intuitionally formal and culturally
engrained rights and courtesies to immigrant groups. Instilling this mindset is of particular time-
liness because, according to the Migration Policy Institute, “the United States has been the top
destination for international migrants since at least 1960, with one-fifth of the world’s migrants
living there as of 2017” (Zong et al., 2018). The U.S.’s ranking carries cache, as it should, and its
making good on such an honorable designation of being welcoming toward and tolerant of immi-
grants bolsters important features of democratic theory—namely having authorial proprietorship
over the narrative of one’s life, a promise that extends past any physical border.
5. Enlarged loyalty
Acceptance within a larger community begins by understanding why there is a loyalty to different
groups in the first place. Throughout history, policy makers have strategically used foundational
rhetoric as a tool to determine who will receive decent treatment. Usage of exclusive language
results in the formation of groups that consist of people who share common characteristics. Such
behavior justifies the indecent treatment of non-group members because it does not extend
loyalty to them. However, the formation of these groups fails to recognize that group members
share more similarities than differences with members of differing groups, as all members
throughout groups are capable of feeling the same emotions. A formation of such groups,
comprised of people who have the ability to feel the same range of emotion, is reflected by
Rorty’s assertion that the extension of decency toward others ought to be informed by the view
that the ability to feel—namely pain here—ranges across species and beyond that of humankind
(Rorty, 1997, p. 12). Human flourishing, as one possible manifestation of decent treatment, is
connected to loyalty and susceptibility to experience pain. Group members’ shared conflict
between loyalty and justice also contributes to strengthening that particular bond. Acting justly,
as foundationally conceived, allows them to uphold their internalized morals, while acting with
loyalty allows them to gain social acceptance. Although an in-group member can convince herself
that she is morally correct, she cannot receive social acceptance without the loyalty of other in-
group members. Furthermore, the rhetoric that in-group members utilize determines who is
considered to be a member of the group. It also suggests that those who do not meet a specific
foundational description must be intrinsically inferior.
A person’s perception of herself plays a role in determining what group with whom she will
identify and, in turn, determine the group in which she will be accepted. The language, dress,
culture, and traditions of immigrants are common factors that distinguish them from the natives
of their adopted countries. However, grouping immigrants on the basis of their differences says
more about a society that distinguishes between in-groups and out-groups than about the
immigrants themselves. As Rorty suggests, it becomes not a matter of “how to define words like
‘truth’ or ‘rationality’ or ‘knowledge’ or ‘philosophy,’ but about what self-image our society should
have of itself” (Rorty, 1989a, p. 175). Defining these terms related to group formation reinforces
the notion of objectivity. The rise of multiple groups could propel divisions among different people
further and allow for discrimination. Indecent treatment stems from in-group and out-group
behavior, and the implication that those who are not a part of the in-group do not possess the
criteria that classifies a group as being fully human. Group members partake in preferential
behavior because they are striving to create a positive social identity for themselves (Tajfel &
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Turner, 2004). For example, researchers conducted an experiment that revealed how a person’s
identity of self is tied to the group to which she believes she belongs. The first part of the
experiment required participants to gauge their identification with a northern Italian group.
However, in the second part of the experiment, the participants had to determine whether
a stranger could be classified as northern Italian, based solely on looking at a photograph. The
findings concluded that those who strongly identified with northern Italy excluded individuals who
looked differently from them, while the individuals who did not strongly identify with northern Italy
were more likely to be more inclusive (Castano et al., 2002). These results indicate that the more
loyal a group member is to her identity of the group, the more likely she will participate in
promoting an in-group and out-group dynamic. It is worth noting that, in this experiment, those
who identified less with a group were more willing to extend group membership to a larger and
more diverse group of people. The finding indicates that the behavior of in-group members toward
the out-group is one of the ways they keep the divisions well and alive.
Another option for accessing the in-group is to change the definition of the out-group. For
example, Theodore Roosevelt, 26th president of the U.S., understood citizenship as having
no divided allegiance here. Any man who says he is an American, but something else also,
isn’t an American at all. We have room for but one flag, the American flag … We have room
for but one language here, and that is the English language … and we have room for but one
sole loyalty and that is a loyalty to the American people. (Roosevelt, n.d.)
Although it may seem as though Roosevelt is taking an accepting approach toward foreigners in
the U.S., we interpret him as suggesting that, in order for those immigrants who are newly arrived,
to earn the loyalty of the American people, they need to assimilate themselves and thus identify as
American by learning the English language. Roosevelt’s requirement for immigrants to learn the
English language is based in foundationalism, as it suggests that being included in the American
group is intrinsically tied to knowing the English language. Knowing the English language is
a foundational implication because it advances the notion that the American identity can only
be attained by immigrants if they wholly abandon their native tongue and remain loyal to the
English language, as doing so would fulfill what is supposedly essential for being a true American.
It is important to reject such assertions because they separate groups on the basis of culture, as
well as biology, and replace scientific inquiry with rigid placements.
Shifting the out-group is also propelled by immigrants themselves. Immigrants were often
separated from those who were considered to be white. The inclusion of immigrants in the larger
white American group occurred gradually over time. For instance, Polish immigrants in Chicago
were not considered to be white until the Irish invited them to join their classified white group.
Those who were included in the larger American group would go on to separate and distinguish
the whites from black people. The Polish, who were at first discriminated against as a result of
their “appearance, religion and culture,” were now being included in the in-group as opposed to
the out-group. Whites were intermarrying with other whites to create an even larger, but still
exclusive white group (Kendzior, 2016). A larger white group became increasingly visible when
“white flight” occurred, which was the mass exodus of whites, who identified as members of the
same in-group, from urban centers. White flight was used as a mechanism to further exclude the
out-group of black people by geographically separating them from the larger white group.
Similar ideas have been expressed by political leaders, like Donald Trump. He has garnered
large support from those who hold an exclusive view of which Americans are in the in-group.
These in-group members are discriminating against those perceived as less American which
includes, for Trump, Mexicans and Muslims. The basis of such discrimination largely derives from
conflating physical traits with perceived morals of these immigrant groups. A more pragmatic
approach toward extending decency to a larger group would include dropping the need to
discriminate based on an individual’s nationality or religion. Rorty exemplifies the effects of
pragmatism:
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[i]t would be better to say: Here is what we … [would] look like as a result of ceasing to hold
slaves, beginning to educate women, separating church and state, and so on. Here is what
happened after we started treating certain distinctions between people as arbitrary rather
than fraught with moral significance. If you would try treating them that way, you might like
the results. Saying that sort of thing seems preferable to saying: Look at how much better
we are at knowing what differences between persons are arbitrary and which not- how
much more rational we are. (Rorty, 1997, pp. 19–20)
Rorty is claiming that America is not defined on the basis of differences. Therefore, it is not
appropriate to exclude immigrants from the larger American group on the basis of language or
other distinguishing characteristics. These characteristics include religion, race, skin color, and
gender, among other distinctive characteristics. Hence, a determining factor for including immi-
grants and out-groups in the larger “American” group should primarily consist of an allegiance to
basic democratic values.
Understanding the threats that go against extending decency is important so that these threats
can be avoided. One such example is the discriminatory rhetoric that influential public figures
employ. Public figures, including Tomi Lahren, utilize social media platforms such as Twitter to
spread their political views today. Social media has proven to be an effective method for not only
reaching a broader audience but also for encouraging participation in politics and political move-
ments (McAffee, 2018). Studies have shown that millennials are encouraged to voice their beliefs
through social media platforms and participate in active movements as a result of the content
they see on social media (Hwang & Kim, 2015). In a recent survey, 69% of Americans find social
media platforms important for the purpose of grasping the attention of politicians, while 67% of
Americans use social media platforms to participate in social change movements (Anderson et al.,
2018). With her 1.2 million Twitter followers, Tomi Lahren has both power and influence over
millennial users (Enli & Simonsen, 2016). Her influence reaches an even larger audience as she is
a big supporter of #MAGA, which stands for Donald Trump’s slogan, “Make America Great Again.”
Her support for Trump has led her to gain recognition from the President. Trump tweeted about
Lahren saying, “Everybody is with Tomi Lahren, a truly outstanding and respected young woman!”
(Saad, 2018). Her popularity is largely a result of the controversial statements that she makes.
Lahren’s controversial statements can be exemplified in a tweet by Fox News that quotes Lahren
in an interview and reads, “You don’t just come in to this country with low skills, low education, not
understanding the language and come into our country because someone says it makes them feel
nice. That’s not what this country is based on” (McAffee, 2018). Lahren’s use of rhetoric that
explicitly emphasizes excluding immigrants from the American group is especially concerning
when considering the wide range of support that Lahren has from young millennials who view
her tweets and see the support that she receives from President Trump.
Specifically, what is more worrisome is Lahren’s use of apocalyptic rhetoric that is employed to
segregate immigrants from the American in-group on the basis of the intrinsic qualities that she
believes immigrants lack. These qualities include education and the ability to speak English. In fact,
immigrant groups in the American labor force hold a higher percentage of bachelor’s and master’s
degrees than do native-born citizens (“Discover More”, 2007). Talent, along with the labor that is
brought by immigrant group members who do not hold degrees, plays a role in revitalizing major
American cities and thus indicates the powerful impact that these immigrants can have if given
the opportunity. It is through Lahren’s use of apocalyptic rhetoric that she is threatening immi-
grants and other out-groups from being included in the larger scope of an American group that
believes in the tenets of democracy. Apocalyptic rhetoric is used as a means of instilling fear in
citizens in order to create prompt action on that fear. The consequences of both Lahren and
Roosevelt’s word choice perpetuate biased narratives against immigrants and the justification of
treating them without decency since they are not accepted into the larger American in-group.
Lahren uses her social influence to villainize immigrants, which then justifies their indecent
treatment. Lahren’s use of social media to belittle immigrants is alarming because, like
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Roosevelt, Lahren is defining the American out-group as having certain characteristics that
Americans do not possess. Instead of defining immigrants on what they are not, she should define
them on what they are, which should be having a shared love for democracy.
It is important here that the in-group of Americans increase, and that decency expand to
a larger group of people because the demographic trends of the American population reveal
a “browning of America.” By 2044, “no one racial group will be the majority of the country”
(Montanaro, 2016). These trends reveal that the majority of Americans will be of immigrant
descent. The demographic shift in politics, as “Republicans have become increasingly reliant on
white, working class voters,” represents a “shrinking share of the voting public” (Montanaro, 2016).
Paradoxically, Lahren herself is a descendant from an immigrant family that possessed the
personal qualities that Lahren criticized as being “un-American” (McAffee, 2018). Characterizing
immigrants as “un-American” on the basis of characteristics including the languages that they
speak, as an example, is a display of foundationalism, which supports the mistreatment of
immigrants. It is self-contradictory for Lahren, or past and present leaders including Benjamin
Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, to use apocalyptic rhetoric and foundationalism to attack immi-
grants in such an extreme manner when Lahren considers herself to be greatly patriotic. Patriotism
stems from a loyalty to democracy that natural born citizens and immigrants alike share.
Therefore, it behooves Americans to extend decency and loyalty to a group that has adopted
the same love and respect for democracy. Lahren is using her freedom of speech to inhibit the
freedom of others. In order to extend decency to a larger group of individuals, figures such as
Lahren should recognize and appreciate the positive contributions that immigrants bring to the
U.S. A healthier alternative to Lahren’s toxic rhetoric would be the use of pragmatic rhetoric, as it
would abandon objectivity and allow for the chance to include a larger group of individuals in the
American group by promoting solidarity. Not only would such an alternative increase the American
group but also promote the extension of decency to more individuals.
The trajectory toward a more utopian rhetoric, where a larger human group is defined by loyalty
and decency rather than foundational criteria, starts with confronting, repudiating, and overcom-
ing these threats to decency. A concept of utopia is not an unfamiliar one to humankind. Humans
have been pursuing the creation of an ideal scenario for millennia. The determining factors of
utopian depictions are dependent on what one imagines as perfect. Plato’s Republic emphasizes
the importance of perfect bodies; later, in More’s Utopia, physical prowess is less of an interest
than the proper inspection of a woman’s body by a potential spouse (Abbott, 2010). However,
falling short of achieving such imagery calls into question the utility of these endeavors, at least
when pursued in such ways (Abbott, 2010). Now, from a pragmatic perspective, exercises in
utopian thought are misguided, in part, due to their prescribed formulation based in foundational
objectivity. For instance, failures brought to bear by utopianism allow for the exclusion of a group
that does not meet the definition of so-called perfection which matches the image of such utopian
formations. An alternative conceptual scheme, however, that could provide greater unity from an
increasingly enlarging membership of in-group candidates is the promotion of democratic loyalty
and the avoidance of feeling pain and enduring suffering.
The move toward such a place can be seen in millennials and GenX-ers, specifically in the
rhetoric of greater inclusion. To that end, the harmful rhetoric utilized by public figures is garnering
strong opposition by these generations. This opposition is a positive trend for future generations,
as it recognizes that the power of Tomi Lahren and similar figures as a threat to democracy.
Threats to democracy consist of inhibiting larger groups from treating its members with decency
and loyalty. To prevent threats from occurring more frequently, currently and in the future
altogether, these generations should become increasingly active in their communities—one
method of which is social media. Furthermore, these generations are taking their views beyond
their electronic devices. The increasing number of protests by millennial and GenX-er organizers
indicates that more individuals in these generations are potentially unwilling to stand for these
threats to democracy (Hwang & Kim, 2015). Protests and political movements, whose goals are to
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achieve greater inclusivity for different groups of people, particularly those historically in need of
structural empathy—and not, say, neo-Nazis—are examples of the kinds of practices needed to
engender decency and loyalty. In this way, the perpetual cycle of exclusion informed by philoso-
phical objectivity can be broken. Moving forward, a break in continuous exclusion can start by
changing the stories told about immigrants in order to create a narrative of acceptance.
6. Conclusion
To understand why a shift from foundational rhetoric to one of pragmatism offers the kind of
potential for promoting greater decency toward immigrants, it is important to study rhetorical
strategies employed in public discourse that introduce and perpetuate larger narratives. The
value for doing so lies in the consequential power of language. The language that influential
figures choose to characterize identities is shown to affect people’s perceptions, which, in turn,
influence subsequent behaviors and actions toward targeted groups of individuals. As such, we
contend that social progress is possible through a rhetorical restructuring of sorts—that is,
toward a pragmatic one. A pragmatic rhetorical restructuring calls on influential figures to realize
that their discourse carries consequences, and that characterizing immigrants through exclu-
sionary language is in itself contradictory to the values of loyalty, solidarity, and decency upon
which America was founded. To that end, we have not only attempted to show the strong legacy
and lingering pervasiveness of foundational discourse in the U.S. but also how pragmatic strands
of thought have influenced—and continue to influence—key historical and contemporary
speeches, positions, and policies. We look to current and future leaders to draw from pragmatic
ideas when characterizing those in greatest need of empathy and place. One specific way in
which to make more plausible a pragmatically conceived utopian society would be to rethink the
notion of loyalty in such a way that offers neighborly dignity through acts of solidarity and
decency.
Funding
The authors received no direct funding for this research.
Author details
Aaron Martin1
E-mail: aaron.martin@wayne.edu
Lisette LeMerise1
E-mail: gh8943@wayne.edu
Riya Chhabra1
E-mail: gh1537@wayne.edu
Sudharshana P. Kanduri1
Julia Beleshi1
E-mail: gh1453@wayne.edu
1 Irvin D. Reid Honors College, Wayne State University,
Detroit, MI, USA.
Citation information
Cite this article as: “Challenging public rhetoric justifying
immigrants as ‘indecent’”, Aaron Martin, Lisette LeMerise,
Riya Chhabra, Sudharshana P. Kanduri & Julia Beleshi,
Cogent Arts & Humanities (2020), 7: 1740538.
References
Abbott, P. (2010). Should utopians have perfect
bodies? Political Science, 42(8), 874–881. doi:
10.1016/j.futures.2010.05.001. Retrieved from
https://www-sciencedirect-com.proxy.lib.wayne.
edu/science/article/pii/S0016328710001060?via%
3Dihub
Anderson, M., Toor, S., Rainie, L., & Smith, A. (2018, July
11). Activism in the social media age. Pew Research
Center website. Retrieved December 19, 2018, from
http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/07/11/activism-in-
the-social-media-age/
Army and navy pension laws and bounty land laws of
the United States (R. Mayo & F. Moulton, Comps.).
(1852). Washington, DC.
Arthur, D., & Woods, W. (2013). The contextual presi-
dency: The negative shift in presidential immigration
rhetoric. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 43(3), 470.
Auxier, R. E., & Hahn, L. E. (Eds.). (2010). The philosophy of
Richard Rorty. Open Court.
Benhabib, S., & Fraser, N. (Eds.). (2004). Pragmatism, cri-
tique, judgment: Essays for Richard J. Bernstein.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Benson, T. W. (2011). The rhetoric of civility: Power,
authenticity, and democracy. Contemporary Rhetoric,
1(1), 22–30. Retrieved from http://eds.a.ebscohost.
com/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=605efe92-
cbd3-41d3-bbd6-0caa8f1af531%40sessionmgr4006
Blum, E. (2018, August 7). Starting a conversation about
anti-blackness. The Christian Century website.
Retrieved December 19, 2018, from https://www.
christiancentury.org/review/books/starting-
conversation-about-anti-blackness
Brock, B., Scott, R., & Chesebro, J. (Eds.). (1990). Methods
of rhetorical criticism: A twentieth-century perspec-
tive, (3), 184.
Castano, E., Yzerbyt, V., Bourguignon, D., & Seron, E.
(2002). Who may enter? The impact of in-group
identification on in-group/out-group
categorization. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 38(3), 315–322. https://doi.org/10.
1006/jesp.2001.1512
Cuza, A. I., & Mocanu, M. (2016). Elements of political
discourse pragmatics. Serie Litere si Stiinte Sociale,
(4), 8–19. Retrieved from http://www.utgjiu.ro/
revista/lit/pdf/2015-04/02_Mocanu.pdf
D’Souza, J., & Gurin, M. (2016). The universal significance
of Maslow’s concept of self-actualization. The
Humanistic Psychologist, 44(2), 210–214. https://doi.
org/10.1037/hum0000027
Devine, C. J. (2015). Ideological social identity:
Psychological attachment to ideological in-groups as
Martin et al., Cogent Arts & Humanities (2020), 7: 1740538
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2020.1740538
Page 17 of 19
a political phenomenon and a behavioral influence.
Political Science, 37(3), 509–535. Retrieved from
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/43653503.pdf?refre
qid=excelsior%
3A8c6374e820d6aa09a9db6a72af500b28
Discover more: Immigration myths and realities. (2007,
September 4). POV website Retrieved December 20,
2018, from http://archive.pov.org/madeinla/immigra
tion-myths-and-realities/
Dunigan, G. (2017). The Chinese exclusion act: Why it
matters today. Susquehanna University Political
Review, 8(1), 82–89. Retrieved from https://scholarly
commons.susqu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1031&context=supr
Enli, G., & Simonsen, C.-A. (2016). ‘Social media logic’
meets professional norms: Twitter hashtags usage by
journalists and politicians. Information, Community &
Society, 21(8), 1081–1096. https://doi.org/10.1080/
1369118X.2017.1301515
Frantz, J. B. (1998). Franklin and the Pennsylvania
Germans. Mid-Atlantic Studies, 65(1), 21–34.
Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/
27774077.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%
3Ae3aa06096915e7037c4292c9c40df401
Gelatt, J. (2017, August). The RAISE act: Dramatic change
to family immigration, less so for the
employment-based system. Migration Policy Institute
website. Retrieved December 19, 2018, from https://
www.migrationpolicy.org/news/raise-act-dramatic-
change-family-immigration-less-so-employment-
based-system
Gunn, J. (2008). Size matters: Polytoning rhetoric’s per-
verse apocalypse. Rhetoric Society Quarterly, 38(1),
82–108. https://doi.org/10.1080/
02773940701779744
Hansler, J. (2017, November 28). Trump’s family denied
German heritage for years. CNN Politics website.
Retrieved December 19, 2018, from https://www.cnn.
com/2017/11/28/politics/trump-family-heritage/
index.html
Here’s Donald Trump’s presidential announcement speech.
(2015, June 16). TIME website. Retrieved December
19, 2018, from http://time.com/3923128/donald-
trump-announcement-speech/
Hollinger, R., & Depew, D. (Eds.). (1995). Pragmatism: From
progressivism to postmodernism. Praeger.
Hussein, B. A.-S. (2012). The sapir-whorf hypothesis today.
Theory and Practice of Language Studies, 2(3),
642–646. Retrieved from ProQuest database. https://
doi.org/10.4304/tpls.2.3.642-646
Hwang, H., & Kim, K.-O. (2015). Social media as a tool for
social movements: The effect of social media use and
social capital on intention to participate in social
movements. International Journal of Consumer
Studies, 39(5), 478–488. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijcs.
2015.39.issue-5
Ivie, R. L. (2017). Trump’s unwitting prophecy. Rhetoric &
Public Affairs, 20(4), 707–717. https://doi.org/10.
14321/rhetpublaffa.20.4.0707
Johnson, J. (2015, December 7). Trump calls for ‘total and
complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United
States’. The Washington Post website. Retrieved
December 19, 2018, from https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-
calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslims-
entering-the-united-states/?utm_term=.b7d9ae0790af
Kendzior, S. (2016, September 1). How do you become
“white” in America? De Correspondent website.
Retrieved December 19, 2018, from https://thecorre
spondent.com/5185/how-do-you-become-white-in-
america/1466577856645-8260d4a7
Lawler, P. A., & Schaffer, R. M. (Eds.). (2016). American poli-
tical rhetoric: Essential speeches and writings (7th ed.).
Rowman & Littlefield.
Maly, M., Dalmage, H., & Michaels, N. (2012). The end of
an idyllic world: Nostalgia narratives, race, and the
construction of white powerlessness. Critical
Sociology, 39(5), 757–779. https://journals.sagepub.
com/doi/abs/10.1177/0896920512448941
McAffee, T. (2018, May 14). Tomi Lahren attacks
U.S. immigrants, gets burned by eye-opening lesson
on her own family tree. People website. Retrieved
December 19, 2018, from https://people.com/politics/
tomi-lahren-immigrants-genealogist-family-tree/
McArdle, A. (2012). Using a Narrative Lens to Understand
Empathy and How it matters in Judging. CUNY
Academic Works, 9, 180–181. Retrieved from https://
academicworks.cuny.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?arti
cle=1127&context=cl_pubs
Montanaro, D. (2016, October 12). How the browning of
America is upending both political parties. NPR web-
site. Retrieved December 19, 2018, from https://
www.npr.org/2016/10/12/497529936/how-the-
browning-of-america-is-upending-both-political-
parties
Mott, F. L. (1936). Benjamin franklin. American Book
Company.
No taxation without representation. (n.d.). Retrieved
December 8, 2018, from Library of Congress website.
https://www.loc.gov/exhibits/magna-carta-muse-and
-mentor/no-taxation-without-representation.html
Reyes, A. (2011). Strategies of legitimization in political
discourse: From words to actions. Discourse &
Society, 22(6), 781–807. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0957926511419927
Roberts, S. (2010, August 25). New life in U.S. no longer
means new name. The New York Times website.
Retrieved December 19, 2018, from https://www.
nytimes.com/2010/08/26/nyregion/26names.html
Roosevelt, T. (n.d.). Quotable quote. Good Reads website.
Retrieved December 19, 2018, from https://www.
goodreads.com/quotes/26007-in-the-first-place-we-
should-insist-that-if-the
Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the mirror of nature.
Princeton University Press.
Rorty, R. (1982). Consequences of pragmatism.
Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota.
Rorty, R. (1988). The priority of democracy to philosophy
(M. D. Peterson & R. C. Vaughn, Eds.). Cambridge
University Press.
Rorty, R. (1989a). Relativism: Interpretation and confron-
tation (M. Krausz, Ed.). University of Notre Dame
Press.
Rorty, R. (1989b). Contingency, irony, and solidarity.
Cambridge University Press.
Rorty, R. (1992). The linguistic turn: Essays in philosophical
method. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago.
Rorty, R. (1993a). Human rights, rationality, and senti-
mentality (S. Shute & S. Hurley, Eds.). Cambridge
University Press.
Rorty, R. (1993b). Putnam and the relativist menace (Vol.
90). Journal of Philosophy.
Rorty, R. (1997). Justice as a larger loyalty (E. Kaempfer &
M. Stepaniants, Eds.). University of Hawaii Press.
Rorty, R. (1999). Philosophy and social hope. Penguin
Books.
Saad, N. (2018). Trump defends Fox News’ Tomi Lahren,
a ‘truly outstanding and respected young woman’. LA
Times website. Retrieved December 20, 2018, from
https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/la-et-
entertainment-news-updates-2018-trump-defends-
tomi-lahren-a-truly-1527090139-htmlstory.html
Martin et al., Cogent Arts & Humanities (2020), 7: 1740538
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2020.1740538
Page 18 of 19
Saatkamp, H. J., Jr. (Ed.). (1995). Rorty & pragmatism: The
philosopher responds to his critics. Vanderbilt
University Press.
Shanahan, E. A., Jones, M. D., McBeth, M. K., & Lane, R. R.
(2013). An angel on the wind: How heroic policy narra-
tives shape policy realities. Policy Studies Journal, 41(3),
453–483. https://doi.org/10.1111/psj.2013.41.issue-3
Stewart, K., & Harding, S. (1999). Bad endings: American
apocalypsis. Annual Review of Anthropology, 28(1),
285–310. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.anthro.28.1.285
Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (2004). The social identity theory
of intergroup behavior. In J. T. Jost & J. Sidanius
(Eds.), Key readings in social psychology. Political
psychology: Key readings (pp. 276–293). Psychology
Press. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203505984-16
Utych, S. M. (2017). How dehumanization influences atti-
tudes toward immigrants. Sage Journals, 71(2),
440–452. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/
1065912917744897
Waldinger, R. (2018). Immigration and the election of Donald
Trump: Why the sociology of migration left us unpre-
pared … and why we should not have been surprised.
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 41(8), 1411–1426. https://doi.
org/10.1080/01419870.2018.1442014
West, C. (1989). The American evasion of philosophy:
A genealogy of pragmatism. The University of
Wisconsin Press.
Zong, J., Batalova, J., & Hallock, J. (2018, February 8).
Frequently requested statistics on immigrants and
immigration in the United States. Migration Policy
Institute website. Retrieved December 19, 2018,
from https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/fre
quently-requested-statistics-immigrants-and-
immigration-united-states
©2020 The Author(s). This open access article is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) 4.0 license.
You are free to:
Share — copy and redistribute the material in any medium or format.
Adapt — remix, transform, and build upon the material for any purpose, even commercially.
The licensor cannot revoke these freedoms as long as you follow the license terms.
Under the following terms:
Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if changes were made.
You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.
No additional restrictions
Youmay not apply legal terms or technological measures that legally restrict others from doing anything the license permits.
Cogent Arts & Humanities (ISSN: 2331-1983) is published by Cogent OA, part of Taylor & Francis Group.
Publishing with Cogent OA ensures:
• Immediate, universal access to your article on publication
• High visibility and discoverability via the Cogent OA website as well as Taylor & Francis Online
• Download and citation statistics for your article
• Rapid online publication
• Input from, and dialog with, expert editors and editorial boards
• Retention of full copyright of your article
• Guaranteed legacy preservation of your article
• Discounts and waivers for authors in developing regions
Submit your manuscript to a Cogent OA journal at www.CogentOA.com
Martin et al., Cogent Arts & Humanities (2020), 7: 1740538
https://doi.org/10.1080/23311983.2020.1740538
Page 19 of 19
